Let us look at the main observations :-
As Sir Thomas Strangman, the Advocate-General, who filed the suit and appeared for the plaintiff throughout the trial, observes in his book "Indian Courts and Characters",
the case is remarkable not only for its length, but for the amazing claims put forward on behalf of the Mullaji, the like of which have never been put forward in any Court of Law.
The question turned upon certain peculiar religious tenets of the Dawoodi Borahs and the peculiar position of the Mullaji Saheb in the eyes of his followers.
According to the contentions put forward on his behalf there could be no trust enforceable in a Court of Law in regard to these properties, for the Mullaji, as ultimate representative of God on earth, was infallible and immaculate; he was accountable only to the "Imam in seclusion", whose immediate representative he was.
In the 16th century the Dai ceased to be Sultani in Yemen and migrated to Guzerat. The Mullaji against whom the suit was filed was the Fifty-first Dai, the line having been carried on by the holder of the office appointing, during his lifetime, his successor. As Sultanis in Yemen the Dais no doubt had sovereign powers:
it was not claimed that any of these sovereign powers survived after their migration to India.
Although the defendants admitted that on the death of the Dai the properties passed on to his successor in office, they still argued that there was no charitable trust enforceable in a court of law, and that the Mullaji Saheb was not accountable to anybody except the Imam in seclusion.
The argument was based on the tenet that the Mullaji Saheb was the representative of God on earth and as such was infallible and immaculate; he was also the Master not only of the property, but also of the mind, body and soul of each of his followers who were bound to obey him implicitly and could not question his acts. The defendants contended that infallibility was inconsistent with accountability as a trustee, and mastership was inconsistent with trusteeship. The Dai was the absolute owner of the Gulla offerings given to him as "Dhani", "Malik" or owner.
In the earlier stages of the trial, it was contended for the defendants that the Mullaji Saheb was in fact God, or for all practical purposes God, and that this suit was a sacrilege. This contention was, however, eventually withdrawn.
He said that the Dai's powers were at least thrice delegated: viz. by God to the Prophet, by the Prophet to the Imam, and by the Imam to the Dai-ul-Mutlak. The Judge wound up this part of the defendants' case with the trenchant remark,
"spiritual heads of communities are not generally remarkable for the modesty with which they state their pretensions".
Referring to the religious books on which the defendants relied, the judge observed that in none of those books was there any indication of the claim, which the Mullaji was specifically putting forward, as regards the Dai being the absolute owner of everything appertaining to the community.
Moreover, the defendants could not produce a single instance of such extreme claims having been exercised by any Mullaji prior to the present suit; and
the defendants' own witnesses made it clear that these claims were at best purely theoretical.
