Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

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Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

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Unread post by Reporter » Mon Jan 26, 2015 4:39 pm

The following are the judgments of California court in the cases involving the custody of Qasr e Aali children. The names of the children are initialized to protect their privacy. The judgments can be accessed here:
http://www.kern.courts.ca.gov/home.aspx ... CH&p1=Left
Family Law Case Information
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Case Category: FamilyLaw
Case Number: S-1501-FL-627601
Last Name: saifuddin
Click Case Number to view the case details.
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Family Law Case Information (3 total records, displaying 1-3 records.)
Case Number Party Name Party Type Case Title Case Type Filing Date
S-1501-FL-627601 MINOR'S COUNSEL, MINOR PARTY SAIFUDDIN VS SAIFUDDIN DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 1/30/2014
S-1501-FL-627601 SAIFUDDIN, ARWA TAHA. PETITIONER SAIFUDDIN VS SAIFUDDIN DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 1/30/2014
S-1501-FL-627601 SAIFUDDIN, TAHA MUFADDAL. RESPONDENT SAIFUDDIN VS SAIFUDDIN DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 1/30/2014

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For a background on the issue read this Mumbai Mirror report: US court gives joint custody of kids to feuding Bohra kin
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California Court judgment – Case 1

The Court issues this Statement of its Tentative Decision consistent with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 632. The Tentative Decision will be the Statement of Decision unless within ten (10) days any party files and serves a document that specifies controverted issues or makes proposals not covered in the Tentative Decision as provided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1590(c). Pending further order, this Tentative Decision constitutes the temporary orders of the Court. The parties are the parents of five minor children: S. T. Saifuddin (born July 30, 1999); M. T. Saifuddin (born July 20, 2001); T. T. Saifuddin (born August 20, 2004); M. T. Saifuddin (born March 3, 2006); and M. T. Saifuddin (born August 3, 2009). On January 30, 2014, Petitioner filed her request for a temporary restraining order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”; Family Code1 section 6200 et seq.) and for custody and visitation orders related to the minor children.

On January 30, 2014, the Court issued temporary orders on an ex parte basis and included personal conduct orders and a stay away order that basically restrained Respondent from contacting Petitioner or the minor children. An order was also made that Petitioner would have sole legal and sole physical custody of the minor children and Respondent would have no visitation.2 Respondent filed his Response to the request for a DVPA restraining order on May 2, 2014. On May 7, 2014, Respondent filed his request for an order requesting, inter alia, that the Court exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3424 and make orders regarding custody and visitation. On August 27, September 23, November 14, 18 and 25, and December 3, 2014, the Court conducted a hearing on the merits of the Petitioner’s request for a DVPA restraining order and on Respondent’s request for the Court to exercise its temporary emergency jurisdiction and return custody of the minor children to him.3 After consideration of the evidence presented and the arguments made, the Court makes the following decisions.
  1. Request for DVPA Restraining Order. The purposes of the DVPA are to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence and to provide for the separation of the persons involved. (§§6220, 6300.) A restraining order may be issued if the information provided shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse. (§6300.) In pertinent part, the DVPA defines domestic violence as “abuse” perpetrated against a spouse. (§6211(a).) Among other things, “abuse” means placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another or engaging in behavior that could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320. (§6203.) Behaviors included in Section 6320 include attacking, threatening, harassing, destroying personal property, contacting by mail or otherwise, or disturbing the peace of the other party. (§6320(a).)

    The decision whether to impose a domestic violence restraining order rests in the discretion of the trial court after consideration of the particular circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495. In the present case, the parties had resided in Mumbai, India prior to Petitioner leaving India on January 17, 2014 and coming to Bakersfield, California where her brother lives. The incidents that Petitioner relies on to support her request for a restraining order all occurred while the parties resided in India.4 To understand the dynamics of this case, the events of January 17, 2014 and those leading up to that date are important. The parties are members of the Dawoodi Bohra faith, a sect of the Muslim religion. The spiritual leader of the Dawoodi Bohra is known as the Syedna. On January 17, 2014, the 52nd Syedna passed away. Because of their family relationships with the Syedna, Petitioner and Respondent are considered part of the royal family leading their sect.5

    Upon his death, there was a dispute over who should be the rightful successor to the Syedna. Petitioner believes it should be her father. Respondent believes it should be his father. Respondent testified that the 52nd Syedna had appointed his father as the successor Syedna two years prior to his death. Following the designation of Respondent’s father as the successor, he and Petitioner did not have any discussion about who each thought should be the rightful successor. At the time of the 52nd Syedna’s death, Respondent and his cousin, Ibrahim Ezzudin (the Respondent in a companion DVPA case brought by his wife, the sister of the Petitioner in this case), were on a religious trip to Sri Lanka. Upon learning of the Syedna’s death, they immediately returned home.

    Unbeknownst to them, Petitioner and her sister had both left India for the United States with their respective children. On January 20, 2014, shortly after their arrival in California, Petitioner posted on You Tube a video of her oldest son, Mohamed, and his cousin Murtaza Ezzudin, pronouncing their maternal grandfather as the rightful Syedna. On January 30, 2014, Petitioner filed her request for a temporary DVPA order. Ex parte orders were granted providing for personal conduct and stay away orders and no visitation for Respondent with the minor children. Based on the testimony presented at the hearing, Petitioner’s reasons for requesting a DVPA order consist generally of the following:
    1. She was repeatedly raped by Respondent during the three-year period prior to her leaving India.
    2. Respondent locked her in a room and would not let her leave.
    3. Respondent threw her cell phone against the wall and broke it.
    4. Respondent would punch his fist into the wall or bang his head against the wall if Petitioner did not want to engage in sex with Respondent.
    5. Respondent threatened to burn M with a lit match when he was angry.
    6. Respondent dragged S out of bed by her hair when he was angry.
    Other than the above allegations, Petitioner’s testimony indicated that she believed she had undergone emotional abuse during the marriage because Respondent would give her the “cold shoulder” or be emotionally distant from her if he was angry with her.6 Some of the family disagreements were over Petitioner’s relationship with her family. She claims Respondent was prejudiced against her father and would not allow her or the children to participate in certain ceremonies or events related to her family. The Court finds that these allegations, even if believed, do not rise to the level of domestic violence as defined by the statute. The Court notes that there were allegations in her declaration in support of the temporary DVPA restraining order related to threats received from followers of Respondent threatening her and her safety. No evidence was presented to substantiate these allegations. Petitioner in her declaration in support of the temporary DVPA restraining order alleged that Respondent had physically assaulted the minor children.

    On cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that Respondent has never hit the children. The only incident alleged by Petitioner related to any possible physical abuse of the children is limited to Respondent grabbing S by the hair. The only incident alleged by Petitioner related to any threat of physical abuse of the children is limited to Respondent threatening M with a match. Petitioner provided extensive testimony regarding the physical abuse she suffered at the hands of Respondent during the last three years they lived together.7

    She claims to have been raped by Respondent repeatedly during that period of time. Respondent denied that he raped Petitioner or threatened to rape her. However, in her deposition testimony read into the record at the hearing, Petitioner stated that Respondent had merely threatened to do so. When asked whether he ever raped her she stated: “I don’t remember. He almost did at times.” The testimony of the witness Umaima Al-Harazi was also inconsistent with Petitioner’s claim Respondent had raped her. Ms. Al-Harazi, who Petitioner described as a very close friend, testified that she and Petitioner exchanged confidences about their personal lives and communicated with each other almost daily.

    In early summer of 2013, Ms. Al-Harazi testified that she had been raped by her husband and had immediately confided in Petitioner about this. When she asked Petitioner if anything like this had happened to her, Petitioner said it had not. Petitioner was also inconsistent in her testimony regarding the number of alleged rapes that occurred in the six-month period prior to leaving India. At the August 27, 2014 hearing, she testified on direct examination that it was maybe two or three times. At the September 23, 2014 hearing, she testified on cross-examination that it could have been approximately ten to twelve times.

    The Court also notes that Petitioner did not allege Respondent had raped her in the declaration in support of the temporary DVPA restraining order. There is only a generic allegation that Respondent had “physically assaulted” her in contrast to more specific allegations of abuse elsewhere in the declaration. It is difficult to believe she would have omitted such a serious charge of sexual assualt from her declaration, denied that there was any rape in her deposition and her statements to her close friend had the events described in her trial testimony actually occurred.

    Given the evidence presented, the Court does not find the Petitioner is credible with respect to her allegations that she was raped by Respondent. Given the lack of credibility regarding such a material portion of her testimony, the Court does not find Petitioner credible in her other testimony as well. The Court has also taken into consideration in assessing the credibility of the Petitioner, statements made concerning her reasons for leaving India. In her deposition taken on May 22, 2014, Petitioner indicated the main reason she left India and Respondent was because of her religious beliefs, i.e. whether her father or the Respondent’s father would succeed as the next Syedna.

    In response to a question from Ms. Al-Harazi about whether she would go back to Respondent “if he believes in your father too” Petitioner stated: “Why do you ask Umaima . . . Of course I would have stayed . . . If [Taha] believed [in Petitioner’s father] I know this for sure, that I would never have gone away with the children like this.” (Respondent’s Exhibit F.) In another message to Ms. Al-Harazi, Petitioner stated: “I’ve told you and I want to tell you again that it was only for imaan and haq that I left the way I did.” (Respondent’s Exhibit H.) Finally, the Petitioner posted the video of her son and her nephew speaking out on the issue of the successor to the Syedna almost immediately upon her arrival in Bakersfield. These statements are all contradictory to the statement contained in the declaration in support of the DVPA restraining order that Petitioner fled India since the domestic violence had “escalated to the point that my children and I grabbed only a few personal belongings, and fled from India for our safety and in fear of being harmed.”

    Because the Court does not find Petitioner’s rendition of the events to be credible, the Court is limited to the testimony of Respondent to determine whether there is a sufficient basis to issue the DVPA restraining order. Respondent during his testimony admitted that certain events testified to by Petitioner occurred (although the particulars of those events differs from those described by Petitioner): he grabbed S by the hair when she refused to get out of bed and get ready to go to school; he threatened to burn M’s tongue with a match for swearing; he threw Petitioner’s cell phone against the wall on one occasion; on another occasion he locked the door to the bedroom to keep Petitioner from going to a workshop; and, he banged his head and/or hand against the wall or side of the bed if frustrated by Petitioner’s lack of interest in having sex.

    With respect to the first event, the Respondent testified that generally he was responsible for getting the children out of bed in the morning and ready for school. One morning in 2013, S did not get up when Respondent first went to her room to get her up. She continued to stall and had not gotten out of bed, Respondent went to her room and grabbed her hair for two or three seconds. S then got up and got dressed for school. On August 12, 1014, the Court heard from S pursuant to Family Code section 3042 regarding her views with respect to custody and visitation issues. The Court had a lengthy conversation with S and at no time did S express any fear of Respondent. In fact, S repeatedly asked that she be allowed to go back to India to live with Respondent.

    With respect to threatening M, Respondent testified that M, seven years old at the time, had been using the “F” word at the dinner table in the presence of the other children. Respondent told M that he should not use that word and asked him to stop. After M continued to repeat the word for about thirty minutes, Respondent grabbed M who was running from him and he told M if he continued to say that word he would put a matchstick in his mouth. Petitioner and Respondent both testified that Respondent has never put a match (lit or otherwise) to any of the children’s tongues. This incident appears to be Respondent’s angry reaction to his son’s continued use of profanity after being told to stop. The Court considers the statement to be the equivalent of threatening to wash a child’s mouth out with soap or the other threats that parents use when children test them through the use of bad language. It is clear that M was not afraid of Respondent based on any prior interactions between father and son, since he continued to use profanity even after being told not to do so. Further, while the Court would not tolerate any parent burning his or her child’s tongue with a lit match, that did not and has not happened.

    Given the context in which these events occurred, the Court does not find that these two events involving the children constitute “abuse” and therefore do not provide a basis for granting a DVPA restraining order. Respondent also conceded that in 2013 he locked the door to the couple’s bedroom when he wanted to have privacy to talk with Petitioner. When Petitioner attempted to leave the room, Respondent prevented her from doing so by standing in front of the door. This resulted in some physical contact between them when they pushed each other. When Petitioner said she wanted to leave, Respondent allowed her to do so. Respondent admitted that he threw Petitioner’s cell phone on one occasion. He had come home from work and Petitioner was sitting on the floor using her computer and also talking on the phone. Respondent wanted to talk to her and she was ignoring him. As a result, he took the phone out of her hand and threw it against the wall.

    Finally, Respondent testified that during the last several years of the marriage there were times when he was interested in sex but Petitioner was not. On occasion, he would tap his head or his hand against the wall in frustration. One time Respondent hit the side of the bed with his fist. In determining whether these incidents support the issuance of a restraining order, the Court has considered the stated purpose of a restraining order to prevent the recurrence of domestic violence. The Court has also considered the nature and seriousness of the acts that Respondent concedes have occurred and whether it warrants the issuance of a DVPA restraining order. The conduct described does not appear to be coercive or of a nature that would be recurring.

    The Court also believes the Petitioner left Respondent not because of any domestic violence that had occurred, but solely because of her strongly held religious belief regarding the proper successor to the Syedna. While Respondent has responded in an immature way in attempting to resolve some of the marital issues, the Court does not believe a restraining order is warranted by the conduct described. Therefore, the Court denies the request for a DVPA restraining order.
  2. Exercise of Emergency Jurisdiction Pursuant to Family Code section 3424. Prior to January 17, 2014, the parties and the minor children had been living in India. No custody orders have been made prior to the Court making the ex parte orders on January 30, 2014. Section 3421, part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) adopted by California, limits this Court’s original jurisdiction to make an initial “child custody determination”8 unless certain conditions are met. The first consideration is whether California is the children’s “home state.” Section 3402(g) defines “home state,” as is relevant here, to be the “state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” Section 3405 requires this Court to consider a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for purposes of applying the UCCJEA.

    Therefore, the Court has treated India as if it were a state of the United States and determined India is the “home state” of the minor children for purposes of determining its jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination.9 Having determined India, and not California, is the home state for the minor children, the Court’s potential for jurisdiction is limited to exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3424. Subsection (a) of Section 3424 provides: “A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse.”

    The law strongly discourages a parent’s exercise of self-help remedies in disputes over children. Conflicts between parents are to be remedied by resort to the courts. Moffat v. Moffat (1980) 27 Cal.3d 645, 652; In re Marriage of Comer (1996) 14 Cal.4th 504, 530. In In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1043, the court discussed the exercise of UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction in the context of a DVPA order issued by the trial court. The court of appeal found that the trial court had jurisdiction under section 3424(a) where one parent had abducted the couple’s children and the husband had engaged in domestic violence: [W]e are not persuaded that Judge Schall was precluded under the facts presented from revisiting the issue of emergency jurisdiction in April 2009, after the California court found that husband engaged in domestic violence against wife that was witnessed by the children and found that husband took the children from wife without an order from any court and prevented wife from seeing them for more than three months. [Footnote omitted.]

    In this case, Petitioner, unhappy with the selection of Respondent’s father (as opposed to her father) as the next Syedna, has taken the children from their home in India and brought them to the United States without the benefit of a court order or any notice to Respondent until after their arrival in California. She did this when Respondent was traveling outside the country. Respondent was unable to have any contact with the children for several months. Once in the United States, Petitioner posted a video of her son and her nephew reading a script prepared by her and her sister proclaiming their belief that Petitioner’s father and not Respondent’s father is the rightful Syedna, placing these children in the middle of the parent’s religious conflict.

    The Court finds these facts sufficient to exercise emergency jurisdiction with respect to custody and visitation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the facts described necessitate the return of the children to the custody of the Respondent forthwith. The Court awards joint legal custody to both parents, with sole physical custody to Respondent. Petitioner shall have visitation with the minor children in India upon 48 hours’ notice to Respondent. Visitation shall occur in the city of residence of the minor children and may be up to one week in length each thirty days. Petitioner shall have reasonable telephone or other electronic contact with the minor children and the children shall have unlimited, unmonitored telephone or other electronic contact with the Petitioner. Section 3424(b) provides that in the event there is no previous child custody order to be enforced under the UCCJEA and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having original jurisdiction, this Court’s child custody determination shall remain in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under the relevant statutes. No evidence was presented that there is such an order. Consequently, the Court’s order will remain in effect until a court of a state having jurisdiction under sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, makes orders regarding the minor children. Respondent shall prepare an order for signature by the Court. Minor’s counsel shall be relieved upon entry of the order.
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1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.

2 The Court has subsequently made a series of orders granting visitation with the children to Respondent subject to certain conditions.

3 This case was heard together with Ezzuddin v. Ezzuddin, Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-1501-FL-627599.

4 Respondent had requested that this Court apply the law of India to its consideration of the DVPA request. The Court has declined to do so. Pursuant to Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, the court must examine the governmental interests or purposes served by the applicable statute or rule of law of each of the affected jurisdictions to determine whether there is a true conflict of law. If such conflict exists, the court must analyze the jurisdictions’ respective interests to determine which jurisdiction’s interest would be more severely impaired if that jurisdiction’s laws were not applied in the particular context presented by the case. Respondent’s request to apply the laws of India did not contain any statement of the law of India so that this Court could make a comparative analysis of the law of each jurisdiction to determine if there is a true conflict that would require a further analysis.

5 The 52nd Syedna was Petitioner’s uncle and Respondent’s grandfather.

6 At one point in the testimony Petitioner described her fear of the repercussions that would follow from not doing what Respondent wanted would be “that he would withhold any emotional expression of care towards in in that he would treat me badly. He would be angry at me. He would interact with me in a very negative manner.” Reporter’s Transcript, August 27, 2014, p. 31, lines 21-24. She also testified that Respondent had told her, “If you do not obey me, I will not talk to you or I will not be with you.” Reporter’s Transcript, August 27, 2014, p. 36, lines 8-9.

7 The Court notes that the declaration submitted by Petitioner generally alleges Respondent “physically assaulted” her. There was no credible testimony of any physical abuse of Petitioner.

8 “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. Fam. C.§3402(c).

9 Given the Court’s determination that India is the children’s “home state” and there is no evidence India has declined to exercise jurisdiction, the remaining potential bases for asserting jurisdiction under Section 3421 are inapplicable

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California Court judgment – Case 2

The Court issues this Statement of its Tentative Decision consistent with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 632. The Tentative Decision will be the Statement of Decision unless within ten (10) days any party files and serves a document that specifies controverted issues or makes proposals not covered in the Tentative Decision as provided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1590(c). Pending further order, this Tentative Decision constitutes the temporary orders of the Court.

The parties are the parents of four minor children: K. Ezzuddin (born July 17, 1998), M. Ezzuddin (born February 15, 2002), N. Ezzuddin (born October 6, 2004) and H. Ezzudin (born December 15, 2008). On January 30, 2014, Petitioner filed her request for a temporary restraining order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”; Family Code1 section 6200 et seq.) and for custody and visitation orders related to the minor children. On January 30, 2014, the Court issued temporary orders on an ex parte basis and included personal conduct orders and a stay away order that basically restrained Respondent from contacting Petitioner or the minor children. An order was also made that Petitioner would have sole legal and sole physical custody of the minor children and Respondent would have no visitation.2

Respondent filed his Response to the request for a DVPA restraining order on May 2, 2014. On May 7, 2014, Respondent filed his request for an order requesting, inter alia, that the Court exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3424 and make orders regarding custody and visitation. On August 27, September 23, November 14, 18 and 25, and December 3, 2014, the Court conducted a hearing on the merits of the Petitioner’s request for a DVPA restraining order and on Respondent’s request for the Court to exercise its temporary emergency jurisdiction and return custody of the minor children to him.3 After consideration of the evidence presented and the arguments made, the Court makes the following decisions.
  1. Request for DVPA Restraining Order. The purposes of the DVPA are to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence and to provide for the separation of the persons involved. (§§6220, 6300.) A restraining order may be issued if the information provided shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse. (§6300.) In pertinent part, the DVPA defines domestic violence as “abuse” perpetrated against a spouse. (§6211(a).) Among other things, “abuse” means placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another or engaging in behavior that could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320. (§6203.) Behaviors included in Section 6320 include attacking, threatening, harassing, destroying personal property, contacting by mail or otherwise, or disturbing the peace of the other party. (§6320(a).) The decision whether to impose a domestic violence restraining order rests in the discretion of the trial court after consideration of the particular circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495.

    In the present case, the parties had resided in Mumbai, India prior to Petitioner leaving India on January 17, 2014 and coming to Bakersfield, California where her brother lives. The incidents that Petitioner relies on to support her request for a restraining order all occurred while the parties resided in India.4 To understand the dynamics of this case, the events of January 17, 2014 and those leading up to that date are important. The parties are members of the Dawoodi Bohra faith, a sect of the Muslim religion. The spiritual leader of the Dawoodi Bohra is known as the Syedna. On January 17, 2014, the 52nd Syedna passed away. Because of their family relationships with the Syedna, Petitioner and Respondent are considered part of the royal family leading their sect.5 Upon his death, there was a dispute over who should be the rightful successor to the Syedna. Petitioner believes it should be her father. Respondent believes it should be his uncle. Two years prior to his death, the 52nd Syedna had appointed Respondent’s uncle as the successor Syedna. Following the designation of Respondent’s uncle as the successor, he and Petitioner did not have any discussion about who each thought should be the rightful successor. At the time of the 52nd Syedna’s death, Respondent and his cousin, Taha Saifuddin (the Respondent in a companion DVPA case brought by his wife, the sister of the Petitioner in this case), were on a religious trip to Sri Lanka. Upon learning of the Syedna’s death, they immediately returned home.

    Unbeknownst to them, Petitioner and her sister had both left India for the United States with their respective children. On January 20, 2014, shortly after their arrival in California, Petitioner helped put together a video that was posted on You Tube showing her oldest son, Murtaza, and his cousin Mohammed Saifuddin, pronouncing their maternal grandfather as the rightful Syedna. On January 30, 2014, Petitioner filed her request for a temporary DVPA order. Ex parte orders were granted providing for personal conduct and stay away orders and no visitation for Respondent with the minor children.

    The declaration in support of the DVPA restraining order is generally framed in general conclusions regarding the basis for the claim of domestic violence, contending Respondent is “mentally and emotionally abusive” or that Respondent subjected Petitioner and the children to “psychological and mental torture.” Based on the testimony presented at the hearing, Petitioner’s reasons for requesting a DVPA order consist generally of the following:
    1. She and Respondent had loud arguments during their marriage. At times, Respondent was shouting loud enough to be heard by persons on the street below the parties’ fifth floor residence where the argument occurred. Petitioner conceded that she and Respondent had many arguments during the marriage and there were occasions when she yelled at the Respondent.
    2. Respondent forced Petitioner to choose between him and her mother, forcing Petitioner to have to see her mother secretly. Respondent also was upset if Petitioner was in contact with her sister so that she had to communicate secretly with her and use code words if Respondent was present.
    3. Respondent was prejudiced against Petitioner’s father and would say derogatory things about him that Respondent found hurtful.
    4. Respondent would come from the mosque late at night and turn the lights on to berate her about things that had not been done for the household.
    5. Respondent, during an argument with Petitioner, slammed a bathroom door when Petitioner was standing in the doorway. Based on the testimony, it appears that the Petitioner followed Respondent to the bathroom when he went there during the argument, and she was in the doorway. Respondent slammed the door shut when she was in the doorway with her hand on the door jamb. She pulled her hand away to avoid having her fingers caught in the closing door. The Court does not believe that Respondent was intending to strike or cause any injury to the Petitioner by his action. Rather, he was simply slamming the door in spite of Petitioner being in the doorway. Petitioner also conceded that she, on occasion, slammed doors.
    6. Approximately five years ago, Respondent bit her cheek. On cross examination, Respondent’s deposition testimony was admitted which indicated that Respondent had a very vague recollection of the incident and could not remember many of the details.
    7. Respondent hit a hotel room wall and injured his hand when he and the Petitioner were having an argument. This occurred approximately five years ago.
    8. Respondent testified to several incidents where she believed Respondent was making unreasonable demands on her. For example, on one occasion in 2013, he told her to cook chick peas for dinner. She was unable to do so because they were unavailable. As a result, Respondent became angry. In response to questions about how these events made her feel, Petitioner stated that she variously felt humiliated, like a slave, belittled, suffocated or hurt. Respondent, during his testimony, did not deny any of the events occurring. Petitioner did not allege that Respondent had struck or physically abused the children.
    In her testimony, she did state that on one occasion the Respondent held H tightly and would not let him go to Petitioner. On another occasion, respondent became angry when the parties’ daughter was singing when the family was going to the mosque. Respondent was upset that she was not focusing on memorizing the Quran. In determining whether these incidents support the issuance of a restraining order, the Court has considered the stated purpose of a restraining order to prevent the recurrence of domestic violence. The Court has also considered the nature and seriousness of the acts that Respondent concedes have occurred and whether it warrants the issuance of a DVPA restraining order. The conduct described does reflect an unhappy marriage where the parties appear to have a fundamental disagreement over their respective roles in the marriage and many of their disagreements lead to loud arguments.

    Petitioner clearly feels she is not treated as an equal in the marriage and Respondent becomes angry when he is unhappy with how things are done at the home. But an argumentative, dysfunctional marriage does not necessarily equate to a basis for the issuance of a restraining order. The Court has also considered the allegations of physical violence. Here, Respondent punched a wall during an argument approximately five years ago. Petitioner also alleged Respondent bit her on the cheek approximately five years ago, although could not remember any significant details of the incident. Given the Court’s view that the arguments that occurred between the parties is insufficient to warrant issuance of a restraining order, these two incidents do not add anything to Petitioner’s claim for a restraining order.

    While a single incident of abuse can lead to the issuance of a restraining order, the Court finds the wall-punching incident to be remote in time and a singular occurrence that does not support the issuance of a DVPA restraining order. The Court does not find the testimony of Petitioner regarding the cheek biting incident to be credible and it is lacking any meaningful detail in order to allow the Court to evaluate the nature of the action. Moreover, the Court believes the Petitioner left Respondent not because of any domestic violence that had occurred, but solely because of her strongly held religious belief regarding the proper successor to the Syedna. Petitioner admitted as much during her direct examination. In deposition testimony admitted at the hearing, Petitioner indicated the she indicated she left India because “I want my kids to be on Haq with me.” Under cross examination, Petitioner stated that it was her belief that unless her children believed in and supported her father, they will not be able to go to heaven.

    Given the Court’s view of the reason Petitioner left India with the children, the Court does view with skepticism the Petitioner’s testimony concerning the arguments that occurred between the parties and the relative role each had in those arguments. In response to the question concerning her primary reason for leaving India on January 17, 2014, she indicated because “Syedna passed away” and she was afraid her children would be taken from her. In later testimony she explained that she was afraid Respondent would throw her out of the house if she didn’t pay allegiance to his uncle, whom he considers the leader of their community. This was the “harm” she feared from the Respondent when she left India. Additionally, in response to questions asked by the Court, Petitioner indicated that the threats she received prior to leaving India had not come from Respondent nor was there any evidence they were made on behalf of the Respondent.6

    The Court has also considered the parties meeting at a park and at a Walmart subsequent to the issuance of the temporary restraining order. The meeting at the Walmart lasted for approximately two hours and involved the parties hugging and kissing. This conduct undercuts any testimony by Petitioner that she feared Respondent. This evidence, coupled with the overwhelming evidence of the actual reason for Petitioner leaving India with the children, further indicates a restraining order is not warranted. Therefore, Court does not believe a restraining order is warranted by the conduct described and denies the request for a DVPA restraining order.
  2. Exercise of Emergency Jurisdiction Pursuant to Family Code section 3424. Prior to January 17, 2014, the parties and the minor children had been living in India. No custody orders have been made prior to the Court making the ex parte orders on January 30, 2014. Section 3421, part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) adopted by California, limits this Court’s original jurisdiction to make an initial “child custody determination"7 unless certain conditions are met. The first consideration is whether California is the children’s “home state.” Section 3402(g) defines “home state,” as is relevant here, to be the “state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.”

    Section 3405 requires this Court to consider a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for purposes of applying the UCCJEA. Therefore, the Court has treated India as if it were a state of the United States and determined India is the “home state” of the minor children for purposes of determining its jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination.8 Having determined India, and not California, is the home state for the minor children, the Court’s potential for jurisdiction is limited to exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3424. Subsection (a) of Section 3424 provides: “A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse.”

    The law strongly discourages a parent’s exercise of self-help remedies in disputes over children. Conflicts between parents are to be remedied by resort to the courts. Moffat v. Moffat (1980) 27 Cal.3d 645, 652; In re Marriage of Comer (1996) 14 Cal.4th 504, 530. In In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1043, the court discussed the exercise of UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction in the context of a DVPA order issued by the trial court. The court of appeal found that the trial court had jurisdiction under section 3424(a) where one parent had abducted the couple’s children and the husband had engaged in domestic violence: [W]e are not persuaded that Judge Schall was precluded under the facts presented from revisiting the issue of emergency jurisdiction in April 2009, after the California court found that husband engaged in domestic violence against wife that was witnessed by the children and found that husband took the children from wife without an order from any court and prevented wife from seeing them for more than three months. [Footnote omitted.]

    In this case, Petitioner, unhappy with the selection of Respondent’s uncle (as opposed to her father) as the next Syedna, has taken the children from their home in India and brought them to the United States without the benefit of a court order or any notice to Respondent until after their arrival in California. She did this when Respondent was traveling outside the country. Respondent was unable to have any contact with the children for several months. Once in the United States, Petitioner posted a video of her son and her nephew reading a script prepared by her and her sister proclaiming their belief that Petitioner’s father and not Respondent’s uncle is the rightful Syedna, placing these children in the middle of the parent’s religious conflict. The Court finds these facts sufficient to exercise emergency jurisdiction with respect to custody and visitation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the facts described necessitate the return of the children to the custody of the Respondent forthwith. The Court awards joint legal custody to both parents, with sole physical custody to Respondent. Petitioner shall have visitation with the minor children in India upon 48 hours’ notice to Respondent.

    Visitation shall occur in the city of residence of the minor children and may be up to one week in length each thirty days. Petitioner shall have reasonable telephone or other electronic contact with the minor children and the children shall have unlimited, unmonitored telephone or other electronic contact with the Petitioner. The Court notes that the parties’ child Khadija has been under a doctor’s care at UCLA Medical Center. The Court’s orders regarding return of the children to Respondent’s custody will require any travel by Khadija to be consistent with any of her doctor’s recommendations. Section 3424(b) provides that in the event there is no previous child custody order to be enforced under the UCCJEA and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having original jurisdiction, this Court’s child custody determination shall remain in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under the relevant statutes. No evidence was presented that there is such an order. Consequently, the Court’s order will remain in effect until a court of a state having jurisdiction under sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, makes orders regarding the minor children. Respondent shall prepare an order for signature by the Court. Minor’s counsel shall be relieved upon entry of the order.
____________________________________________________________

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.

2 The Court has subsequently made a series of orders granting visitation with the children to Respondent subject to certain conditions.

3 This case was heard together with Saifuddin v. Saifuddin, Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-1501-FL-627601.

4 Respondent had requested that this Court apply the law of India to its consideration of the DVPA request. The Court has declined to do so. Pursuant to Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, the court must examine the governmental interests or purposes served by the applicable statute or rule of law of each of the affected jurisdictions to determine whether there is a true conflict of law. If such conflict exists, the court must analyze the jurisdictions’ respective interests to determine which jurisdiction’s interest would be more severely impaired if that jurisdiction’s laws were not applied in the particular context presented by the case. Respondent’s request to apply the laws of India did not contain any statement of the law of India so that this Court could make a comparative analysis of the law of each jurisdiction to determine if there is a true conflict that would require a further analysis.

5 The 52nd Syedna was Petitioner’s uncle and Respondent’s grandfather.

6 In Petitioner’s deposition testimony admitted during the hearing, Petitioner was asked whether there were any statements or writings from Respondent in the six months prior to her leaving India that indicated Respondent would persecute her if she did not support his uncle. Her answer was: “He has not specifically told me anything.”

7 “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. Fam. C.§3402(c). 8 Given the Court’s determination that India is the children’s “home state” and there is no evidence India has declined to exercise jurisdiction, the remaining potential bases for asserting jurisdiction under Section 3421 are inapplicable.

Ozdundee
Posts: 866
Joined: Wed May 29, 2013 6:57 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#2

Unread post by Ozdundee » Mon Jan 26, 2015 4:55 pm

Mind blowing.....cracking ...sizzling hot...Reporter good work.

The point here is not enjoying their marriage issues...but to expose the secretive lives of the highest family...the holier than thou pedestal people have placed them on. Is any of this your 54th ?

What did I say a week ago and GM Bhai gave a cliff hanger. ....is more to come keep watching this channel ?

ghulam muhammed
Posts: 11653
Joined: Tue Oct 07, 2008 5:34 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#3

Unread post by ghulam muhammed » Mon Jan 26, 2015 5:05 pm

The charges traded against each other are enough proof to conclude that they are mortals like everyone else and don't need to be treated as divine beings born out of some divine personality !! This is just a tip of an iceberg and more skeletons could come out of the closet of the so called Royal family which is given undue importance and pampered by the gullible bohras.

james
Posts: 550
Joined: Mon Feb 17, 2014 4:06 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#4

Unread post by james » Mon Jan 26, 2015 5:09 pm

Ozdundee wrote:Mind blowing.....cracking ...sizzling hot...Reporter good work.

The point here is not enjoying their marriage issues...but to expose the secretive lives of the highest family...the holier than thou pedestal people have placed them on. Is any of this your 54th ?

What did I say a week ago and GM Bhai gave a cliff hanger. ....is more to come keep watching this channel ?
Backslapper,

Get your head out of his lying ass.

Regards.

http://dawoodi-bohras.com/forum/viewtop ... 92#p154392

kimanumanu
Posts: 607
Joined: Wed Apr 09, 2014 2:16 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#5

Unread post by kimanumanu » Mon Jan 26, 2015 5:28 pm

Must admit the daughters of SKQ do not come out too well in all this. This should have never gone to court as it is very clear that the only reason they did what they did was because of the schism.

ghulam muhammed
Posts: 11653
Joined: Tue Oct 07, 2008 5:34 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#6

Unread post by ghulam muhammed » Mon Jan 26, 2015 5:36 pm

james wrote:
Ozdundee wrote:Mind blowing.....cracking ...sizzling hot...Reporter good work.

The point here is not enjoying their marriage issues...but to expose the secretive lives of the highest family...the holier than thou pedestal people have placed them on. Is any of this your 54th ?

What did I say a week ago and GM Bhai gave a cliff hanger. ....is more to come keep watching this channel ?
Backslapper,

Get your head out of his lying ass.

Regards.

http://dawoodi-bohras.com/forum/viewtop ... 92#p154392
Firstly, you get your own head out of your Master's lying ass ! Instead of cherry picking the technicalities of my post why don't you express your views on some of your master's son's confessions which he openly made in the court of law !! BTW, even KQ's daughters statements should be viewed from the same spectrum in my personal view.

qjbj
Posts: 157
Joined: Fri Feb 21, 2014 5:47 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#7

Unread post by qjbj » Mon Jan 26, 2015 5:39 pm

I have to disagree. No one comes out too well in cases of child abuse and allegations of rape. I have to give SKQ daughters high marks for bringing any allegations of rape to the courts. We all know the record of rape in India...not very good. It is high time that they bring up any allegations of rape against that may have occurred whether there was schism or not.

ghulam muhammed
Posts: 11653
Joined: Tue Oct 07, 2008 5:34 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#8

Unread post by ghulam muhammed » Mon Jan 26, 2015 6:11 pm

The important points which need to be highlighted are :-
Reporter wrote: US court gives joint custody of kids to feuding Bohra kin
Reporter wrote:On January 30, 2014, the Court issued temporary orders on an ex parte basis
Reporter wrote:
1. She was repeatedly raped by Respondent during the three-year period prior to her leaving India.
2. Respondent locked her in a room and would not let her leave.
3. Respondent threw her cell phone against the wall and broke it.
4. Respondent would punch his fist into the wall or bang his head against the wall if Petitioner did not want to engage in sex with Respondent.
5. Respondent threatened to burn M with a lit match when he was angry.
6. Respondent dragged S out of bed by her hair when he was angry.
Reporter wrote:
1. She and Respondent had loud arguments during their marriage. At times, Respondent was shouting loud enough to be heard by persons on the street below the parties’ fifth floor residence where the argument occurred. Petitioner conceded that she and Respondent had many arguments during the marriage and there were occasions when she yelled at the Respondent.

2. Respondent forced Petitioner to choose between him and her mother, forcing Petitioner to have to see her mother secretly. Respondent also was upset if Petitioner was in contact with her sister so that she had to communicate secretly with her and use code words if Respondent was present.

3. Respondent was prejudiced against Petitioner’s father and would say derogatory things about him that Respondent found hurtful.

4. Respondent would come from the mosque late at night and turn the lights on to berate her about things that had not been done for the household.

5. Respondent, during an argument with Petitioner, slammed a bathroom door when Petitioner was standing in the doorway. Based on the testimony, it appears that the Petitioner followed Respondent to the bathroom when he went there during the argument, and she was in the doorway. Respondent slammed the door shut when she was in the doorway with her hand on the door jamb. She pulled her hand away to avoid having her fingers caught in the closing door. The Court does not believe that Respondent was intending to strike or cause any injury to the Petitioner by his action. Rather, he was simply slamming the door in spite of Petitioner being in the doorway. Petitioner also conceded that she, on occasion, slammed doors.

6. Approximately five years ago, Respondent bit her cheek. On cross examination, Respondent’s deposition testimony was admitted which indicated that Respondent had a very vague recollection of the incident and could not remember many of the details.

7. Respondent hit a hotel room wall and injured his hand when he and the Petitioner were having an argument. This occurred approximately five years ago.

8. Respondent testified to several incidents where she believed Respondent was making unreasonable demands on her. For example, on one occasion in 2013, he told her to cook chick peas for dinner. She was unable to do so because they were unavailable. As a result, Respondent became angry. In response to questions about how these events made her feel, Petitioner stated that she variously felt humiliated, like a slave, belittled, suffocated or hurt. Respondent, during his testimony, did not deny any of the events occurring. Petitioner did not allege that Respondent had struck or physically abused the children.

fustrate_Bohra
Posts: 678
Joined: Mon Nov 25, 2013 6:46 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#9

Unread post by fustrate_Bohra » Tue Jan 27, 2015 12:11 am

These has to be sensationalize in all the leading newspaper in the countries especially INDIA. These DACOIT family had ruined many families. Uptill now had only heard about "Uparwale ke ghar der hain per andher nahin" i think i am now actually experiencing it in this dacoit, cheap family.

topiwala
Posts: 150
Joined: Thu Sep 18, 2014 1:02 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#10

Unread post by topiwala » Tue Jan 27, 2015 4:00 am

Why you people love to slander our Maula? Why dont you rather criticize the Sunni caliphs? This site should be held responsible for driving gullible bohras to sunni\wahhabi etc. You people operate just like wahhabis!

asad
Posts: 777
Joined: Thu Dec 29, 2011 12:54 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#11

Unread post by asad » Tue Jan 27, 2015 5:38 am

topiwala wrote:Why you people love to slander our Maula? Why dont you rather criticize the Sunni caliphs? This site should be held responsible for driving gullible bohras to sunni\wahhabi etc. You people operate just like wahhabis!

This site has not achieved as much as your Moula has achieved in driving people towards either Salafism or Atheism.

NoorAli-M
Posts: 95
Joined: Sun Jan 25, 2015 9:28 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#12

Unread post by NoorAli-M » Tue Jan 27, 2015 6:05 am

This is unbelievable I didnt know those three amar akbar anthony type looking white dress chaps has soo much trouble in head.

This is going to upset MS big time now.

Ozdundee
Posts: 866
Joined: Wed May 29, 2013 6:57 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#13

Unread post by Ozdundee » Tue Jan 27, 2015 6:49 am

james wrote:
Ozdundee wrote:Mind blowing.....cracking ...sizzling hot...Reporter good work.

The point here is not enjoying their marriage issues...but to expose the secretive lives of the highest family...the holier than thou pedestal people have placed them on. Is any of this your 54th ?

What did I say a week ago and GM Bhai gave a cliff hanger. ....is more to come keep watching this channel ?
Backslapper,

Get your head out of his lying ass.

Regards.

http://dawoodi-bohras.com/forum/viewtop ... 92#p154392
James is that your best comment for this topic?

Ozdundee
Posts: 866
Joined: Wed May 29, 2013 6:57 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#14

Unread post by Ozdundee » Tue Jan 27, 2015 7:00 am

Pope Alexander VI, making a salient point about leadership and hanging on to it.

"Do you know what is more poisonous than failure in war or politics?" the Borgia Pope asks his son rhetorically, "Ridicule!"

Under siege from enemies inside the Vatican and beyond, the embattled pontiff, (supposedly) understood that the derision which flows from the loss of public respect, erodes prestige far more effectively than some remote military setback ever could.


getting these clowns fall on their own sword is so fun

Sceptical
Posts: 248
Joined: Fri Apr 19, 2013 3:38 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#15

Unread post by Sceptical » Tue Jan 27, 2015 8:50 am

I begin to think that SMB(ra) aim, by not publicly appointing a successor, was to clean up the so-called royal family. :roll:
So that was the "hikmat" behind the 53rd Dai controversy ? :roll:

Indeed, the Catholic Church through the same scandals in 14th and 15th century (Pope Borgia, Della Rovere, ...).
it led to the Protestant Catholic schism with Luther.

fustrate_Bohra
Posts: 678
Joined: Mon Nov 25, 2013 6:46 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#16

Unread post by fustrate_Bohra » Tue Jan 27, 2015 10:44 am

Sceptical wrote:I begin to think that SMB(ra) aim, by not publicly appointing a successor, was to clean up the so-called royal family. :roll:
So that was the "hikmat" behind the 53rd Dai controversy ? :roll:

Indeed, the Catholic Church through the same scandals in 14th and 15th century (Pope Borgia, Della Rovere, ...).
it led to the Protestant Catholic schism with Luther.
How can this kind of cheap people who dont know how to behave with their immediate relatives (father, mother, wife, uncles.....) and other human being in general can be termed as ROYAL. These people are even lower than illiterate slum people. I suggest avoid using word ROYAL and QASRE-ALI while addressing this DACOIT/CHEAP people.

Moiz_Dhaanu
Posts: 335
Joined: Sun Jul 06, 2014 11:57 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#17

Unread post by Moiz_Dhaanu » Tue Jan 27, 2015 11:26 am

topiwala wrote:Why you people love to slander our Maula? Why dont you rather criticize the Sunni caliphs? This site should be held responsible for driving gullible bohras to sunni\wahhabi etc. You people operate just like wahhabis!
what a joke !!
So when Bohras listen and abide to your Moula(DMBS) who gives absolute nonsense fatwaas (like roti making will lead to jannat and women to be thrown out of house for not wearing ridah), they are not gullible but are doing it out of ikhlaas,
And when those same "ikhlaasi" bohras come on this website and read factual matter(which makes them aware of the truth) and try questioning your moula's actions then you term them "Gullible"..
Waah!! what 2-prongued idealogy you followers of DMBS have :twisted:

DMBS = Dawedaar Mufaddal Bhai Saheb

SBM
Posts: 6226
Joined: Sun May 09, 2004 4:01 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#18

Unread post by SBM » Tue Jan 27, 2015 12:23 pm

After reading the entire court case, this is what I can say
CHIRAG TALEY ANDHERA
I hope that ordinary Abdes/Amtes can read this entire case in Gujrati or Lissan E Dawat so they understand that every thing WHITE is not pure (pun intended)
It also brings that despite all the shouting of Abdes about Moula being Masoom one can see that this family is just like any other ordinary family having to deal with marital problems.
One other thing is now becoming clear why Muffadal does not like educated Bohra female as he sees how an educated woman can damage his Male Chauvinist genes. May be SMS is looking at history and sees how Khadijah (Prophet Mohammed SAW wife) role--without her help and support Islam would not the be fastest growing religion at early stage. SMS also looks how it was a woman Hurrut Ul Maleka without whose help, he would not be sitting where he is, His failed marriage to SKQ daughter and then seeing Arwa dominating his son may have ignited the fear of Female Power in his dynasty and that is why he is asking Amtes to quit going to work and isolate themselves in the corner of the kitchen and dance at the tune of their husbands. May be he sees how he and his children lost control over their Wives and to avenge, they now want to control all the AMTES. He is trying to hide his own shame by shaming Abdes to control their spouses.
This case also highlights why SMS started sending LAANAT on SKQ it had nothing to do with Imaan or Haaq but the revenge of failed marriages and family hate.
No wonder he did not want any Mobahila because it is not about who is rightful successor but it is personal. SKQ daughters have tarnished the image of his son regardless of the baseless charges but dirt has been splashed.
I do not think that SMS or SKQ ever imagined that these court cases with salacious detail will become public. After reading these cases I can only conclude that both parties are guilty of lying and deceit. Both are using Religion to justify their actions and children have become Pawns in their game. Very sorry state of affairs indeed.

NoorAli-M
Posts: 95
Joined: Sun Jan 25, 2015 9:28 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#19

Unread post by NoorAli-M » Tue Jan 27, 2015 12:51 pm

Sceptical wrote:I begin to think that SMB(ra) aim, by not publicly appointing a successor, was to clean up the so-called royal family. :roll:
So that was the "hikmat" behind the 53rd Dai controversy ? :roll:

Indeed, the Catholic Church through the same scandals in 14th and 15th century (Pope Borgia, Della Rovere, ...).
it led to the Protestant Catholic schism with Luther.
you have some serious point but do you really think there will be any cleaning in so called royals? till now they are just continuing what they are just used to doing from several years now.

qjbj
Posts: 157
Joined: Fri Feb 21, 2014 5:47 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#20

Unread post by qjbj » Tue Jan 27, 2015 11:14 pm

Those who are claiming SKQ daughters may be reporting baseless charges of rape should read following article on rape statistics in India. I bet these women were raped by their husbands but shame and family situation in saifee mahal prevented them not reporting these. Considering the way SKQ was being treated in saifee mahal which women in that place would dare report these charges to anyone, especially those marrried to SMS and QJ sons.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/m ... 524794.ece

Just 2.3 per cent of rape was by men other than the husbands.
Husbands commit a majority of acts of sexual violence in India, and just one per cent of marital rapes and six per cent of rapes by men other than husbands are reported to the police, new estimates show

qjbj
Posts: 157
Joined: Fri Feb 21, 2014 5:47 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#21

Unread post by qjbj » Wed Jan 28, 2015 12:08 am

^
I guess your version of Islam has given the husbands the right to rape their wives. You will fit nicely with SMS and QJ sons. Hope you don't go around professing your version of Islam......you will end up in jail and get a taste of what being raped means when the inmates get a hold of you and bend you down.

qutub_mamajiwala
Posts: 1001
Joined: Tue Jul 23, 2013 4:17 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#22

Unread post by qutub_mamajiwala » Wed Jan 28, 2015 1:35 am

do research and you will find husband is given lots of rights over wife Islamically.

this right is not given by islam, but the followers of it like u.

NoorAli-M
Posts: 95
Joined: Sun Jan 25, 2015 9:28 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#23

Unread post by NoorAli-M » Wed Jan 28, 2015 2:26 am

Have you heard about 498A section in Indian penal code.

This is one of the heinous section in Indian history, now a day most (not all) are trying to take advantage of those section by dragging her husband to court of law.

check this forum

http://www.498a.org/

asad
Posts: 777
Joined: Thu Dec 29, 2011 12:54 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#24

Unread post by asad » Wed Jan 28, 2015 2:45 am

Case Judgement has been translated in Hindi with Google translate for people who cant understand English. Its not perfect but could be understood. You can share the same with people who are interested.

Qasr ई Aali बच्चों की हिरासत से जुड़े मामलों में कैलिफोर्निया अदालत के निर्णय कर रहे हैं निम्नलिखित। बच्चों के नाम उनकी गोपनीयता की रक्षा करने के लिए प्रारंभ कर रहे हैं। निर्णय यहाँ तक पहुँचा जा सकता है:
http://www.kern.courts.ca.gov/home.aspx ... CH&p1=Left
परिवार कानून मामला सूचना
खोज मापदंडों:
प्रकरण श्रेणी: FamilyLaw
केस नंबर: एस-1501-फ्लोरिडा-627,601
अंतिम नाम: सैफुद्दीन
मामले विवरण देखने के लिए मामले नंबर पर क्लिक करें।
इस पृष्ठ की सॉर्ट क्रम बदलने के लिए कॉलम शीर्ष क्लिक करें
परिवार कानून मामला सूचना (3 कुल अभिलेख, 1-3 अभिलेख प्रदर्शित।)
केस नंबर पार्टी का नाम पार्टी प्रकार प्रकरण शीर्षक प्रकरण प्रकार दाखिल करने की तारीख
एस-1501-फ्लोरिडा-627,601 अवयस्क के वकील, शादी 2014/01/30 की मामूली पार्टी सैफुद्दीन वी.एस. सैफुद्दीन विघटन
एस-1501-फ्लोरिडा-627,601 सैफुद्दीन, Arwa ताहा। विवाह 2014/01/30 के याचिकाकर्ता सैफुद्दीन वी.एस. सैफुद्दीन विघटन
एस-1501-फ्लोरिडा-627,601 सैफुद्दीन, ताहा MUFADDAL। विवाह 2014/01/30 के उत्तरदाता सैफुद्दीन वी.एस. सैफुद्दीन विघटन

___________________________________________________________

इस मुद्दे पर एक पृष्ठभूमि के लिए इस मुंबई मिरर रिपोर्ट पढ़ें: अमेरिकी अदालत बोहरा परिजनों झगड़ते करने के लिए बच्चों की संयुक्त हिरासत देता है
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कैलिफोर्निया न्यायालय के उस फैसले - प्रकरण 1

कोर्ट ने दस (10) दिनों के भीतर किसी भी पार्टी फ़ाइलें और controverted मुद्दों या बनावट यह बताता है कि एक दस्तावेज़ में कार्य करता है, जब तक अंतरिम निर्णय निर्णय का विवरण होगा सिविल प्रक्रिया अनुभाग 632. संहिता के प्रावधानों के अनुरूप अपनी अंतरिम निर्णय के इस बयान जारी करता है न्यायालय के कैलिफोर्निया नियम द्वारा प्रदान की जाने वाली अंतरिम निर्णय में शामिल नहीं प्रस्तावों, 3.1590 (ग) नियम। अगले आदेश लंबित है, इस अंतरिम निर्णय न्यायालय के अस्थायी आदेश का गठन किया। पार्टियों पांच नाबालिग बच्चों के माता पिता हैं: अनुसूचित जनजाति सैफुद्दीन (30 जुलाई 1999) का जन्म; एम टी सैफुद्दीन (20 जुलाई 2001) का जन्म; (20 अगस्त 2004) का जन्म टी टी सैफुद्दीन; एम टी सैफुद्दीन (3 मार्च 2006) का जन्म; और एम टी सैफुद्दीन (3 अगस्त 2009) का जन्म। 30 जनवरी 2014 को याचिकाकर्ता घरेलू हिंसा निवारण अधिनियम के अनुसार एक अस्थायी निरोधक आदेश के लिए उसके अनुरोध दायर ("DVPA"; परिवार Code1 खंड 6200 एट seq।) और नाबालिग बच्चों से संबंधित हिरासत और मुलाक़ात आदेश के लिए।

30 जनवरी 2014 को, अदालत ने एक पक्षीय आधार पर अस्थायी आदेश जारी किए और मूल रूप से याचिकाकर्ता या नाबालिग बच्चों से संपर्क करने से प्रतिवादी रोका कि व्यक्तिगत आचरण के आदेश और एक रहने दूर क्रम शामिल थे। एक आदेश भी याचिकाकर्ता कोई visitation.2 प्रतिवादी 7 मई 2014 को 2 मई, 2014 पर एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए अनुरोध करने के लिए अपनी प्रतिक्रिया दायर होता है छोटे बच्चों और प्रतिवादी के एकमात्र कानूनी और एकमात्र शारीरिक हिरासत होता है कि बनाया गया था प्रतिवादी न्यायालय की धारा 3424 के अनुसार अस्थायी आपात अधिकारिता का प्रयोग और हिरासत और मुलाक़ात के बारे में आदेश है कि, एक का अनुरोध आदेश, अन्य बातों के साथ के लिए उनके अनुरोध दायर किया। कोर्ट ने अपने अस्थायी आपात अधिकारिता का प्रयोग करने के लिए 27 अगस्त, 23 सितंबर, 14 नवंबर, 18 और 25, और 3 दिसंबर, 2014 को, कोर्ट के एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए और प्रतिवादी के अनुरोध पर याचिकाकर्ता के अनुरोध की योग्यता के आधार पर एक सुनवाई आयोजित और नाबालिग बच्चों की वापसी हिरासत प्रस्तुत साक्ष्य के विचार के बाद him.3 करने और किए गए तर्कों, कोर्ट निम्नलिखित निर्णय करता है।

DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए अनुरोध। DVPA के प्रयोजनों के लिए घरेलू हिंसा की पुनरावृत्ति को रोकने के लिए और इसमें शामिल व्यक्तियों के विभाजन के लिए प्रदान करने के लिए कर रहे हैं। (§§6220, 6300) की जानकारी अदालत ने पिछले एक अधिनियम या दुरुपयोग के कृत्यों के उचित सबूत की संतुष्टि के लिए, शो प्रदान की अगर एक निरोधक आदेश जारी किया जा सकता है। (§6300।) उचित भाग में, DVPA एक पति के खिलाफ बढ़ावा "दुरुपयोग" के रूप में घरेलू हिंसा को परिभाषित करता है। (§6211 (क)।) अन्य बातों के अलावा, "दुरुपयोग" उस व्यक्ति को या किसी अन्य के लिए आसन्न गंभीर शारीरिक चोट की उचित आशंका में एक व्यक्ति को रखने या अनुसारी धारा 6320. (§6203 को enjoined जा सकता है कि व्यवहार में उलझाने का मतलब है। ) व्यवहार धारा 6320 में शामिल है, पर हमला करने की धमकी, परेशान, निजी संपत्ति को नष्ट करने, मेल से संपर्क करने या अन्यथा, या अन्य पार्टी की शांति को परेशान करने में शामिल हैं। (§6320 (क)।)

एक घरेलू हिंसा निरोधक आदेश लागू करने के लिए कि क्या निर्णय प्रत्येक मामले के विशेष परिस्थितियों पर विचार करने के बाद निचली अदालत के विवेक में टिकी हुई है। वर्तमान मामले में नाडकर्णी की शादी (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495. फिर से, पार्टियों से पहले याचिकाकर्ता जहां उसके भाई 17 जनवरी 2014 को भारत छोड़ने और बेकर्सफील्ड, कैलिफोर्निया के लिए आने के लिए मुंबई, भारत में बसता था रहता है। पार्टियों को इस मामले की गतिशीलता को समझने के लिए India.4 में बसता है, जबकि याचिकाकर्ता एक निरोधक आदेश के लिए उसके अनुरोध का समर्थन करने पर निर्भर करता है कि घटनाओं सब हुआ, 17 जनवरी, 2014 के घटनाओं और उस तारीख को अग्रणी उन महत्वपूर्ण हैं। पार्टियों दाऊदी बोहरा विश्वास, मुस्लिम धर्म का एक संप्रदाय के सदस्य हैं। दाऊदी बोहरा के आध्यात्मिक नेता Syedna के रूप में जाना जाता है। 17 जनवरी 2014 को, 52 Syedna निधन हो गया। Syedna याचिकाकर्ता और प्रतिवादी के साथ उनके परिवार के रिश्तों के अपने sect.5 प्रमुख शाही परिवार का हिस्सा माना जाता है क्योंकि

उसकी मौत पर, Syedna के लिए वास्तविक उत्तराधिकारी होना चाहिए जो पर एक विवाद नहीं था। याचिकाकर्ता यह उसके पिता होना चाहिए विश्वास रखता है। प्रतिवादी यह अपने पिता होना चाहिए विश्वास रखता है। प्रतिवादी 52 Syedna उसकी मौत के लिए दो साल पहले उत्तराधिकारी Syedna रूप में अपने पिता की नियुक्ति की थी कि गवाही दी थी। उत्तराधिकारी के रूप में प्रतिवादी के पिता के पद पर नियुक्ति के बाद, वह और याचिकाकर्ता प्रत्येक सोचा वास्तविक उत्तराधिकारी होना चाहिए, जो के बारे में कोई चर्चा नहीं था। 52 Syedna की मृत्यु के समय, प्रतिवादी और उनके चचेरे भाई इब्राहिम Ezzudin (उनकी पत्नी, इस मामले में याचिकाकर्ता की बहन द्वारा लाया एक साथी DVPA मामले में प्रतिवादी), श्रीलंका के लिए एक धार्मिक यात्रा पर थे। Syedna की मौत के सीखने पर, वे तुरंत घर लौट आए।

उन्हें अनजान, याचिकाकर्ता और उसकी बहन दोनों अपने-अपने बच्चों के साथ संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के लिए भारत छोड़ दिया था। 20 जनवरी 2014 को, कुछ ही देर में कैलिफोर्निया में उनके आने के बाद याचिकाकर्ता वास्तविक Syedna के रूप में उनके नाना उच्चारण, तुम ट्यूब पर उसे सबसे पुराने बेटे, मोहम्मद, और उसके चचेरे भाई मुर्तजा Ezzudin का एक वीडियो पोस्ट किया। 30 जनवरी 2014 को याचिकाकर्ता एक अस्थायी DVPA आदेश के लिए उसके अनुरोध दायर किया। पक्षीय आदेश के व्यक्तिगत आचरण के लिए उपलब्ध कराने और आदेश दूर रहने और नाबालिग बच्चों के साथ प्रतिवादी के लिए कोई मुलाक़ात दिए गए। सुनवाई में प्रस्तुत गवाही के आधार पर, एक DVPA आदेश अनुरोध करने के लिए याचिकाकर्ता के कारणों निम्न में से आम तौर पर मिलकर बनता है:

वो बार बार पूर्व उसे छोड़कर भारत के लिए तीन साल की अवधि के दौरान प्रतिवादी द्वारा बलात्कार किया गया था।
प्रतिवादी एक कमरे में उसे बंद कर दिया और उसे छोड़ नहीं देना होगा।
प्रतिवादी की दीवार के खिलाफ उसके सेल फोन फेंक दिया और उसे तोड़ दिया।
प्रतिवादी दीवार में अपनी मुट्ठी पंच या याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी के साथ सेक्स में संलग्न नहीं करना चाहता था अगर दीवार के खिलाफ अपने सिर पटक होगा।
वह गुस्से में था जब प्रतिवादी एक जलाया मैच के साथ एम जलाने की धमकी दी।
वह गुस्से में था जब प्रतिवादी उसके बालों से बिस्तर से बाहर एस घसीटा।

ऊपर दिए गए आरोपों के अलावा, याचिकाकर्ता की गवाही वह प्रतिवादी उसे "ठंड कंधे" दे या वह परिवार असहमति के her.6 कुछ के साथ गुस्से में था कि अगर उसके पास से भावनात्मक रूप से दूर हो जाएगा क्योंकि वह शादी के दौरान भावनात्मक शोषण आया था माना संकेत दिया कि थे उसके परिवार के साथ याचिकाकर्ता का रिश्ता खत्म। वह प्रतिवादी उसके पिता के खिलाफ पक्षपातपूर्ण किया गया था और उसे या बच्चों को उसके परिवार से संबंधित कुछ समारोहों या घटनाओं में भाग लेने के लिए अनुमति नहीं होगी दावा किया है। न्यायालय क़ानून द्वारा परिभाषित के रूप में इन आरोपों का मानना है, भले ही घरेलू हिंसा के स्तर तक बढ़ नहीं है कि पाता है। कोर्ट ने उसे और उसकी सुरक्षा की धमकी प्रतिवादी के अनुयायियों से मिली धमकियों से संबंधित अस्थायी DVPA निरोधक आदेश के समर्थन में उसकी घोषणा में आरोप थे कि नोटों। कोई सबूत नहीं है कि इन आरोपों को पुष्ट करने के लिए प्रस्तुत किया गया था। अस्थायी DVPA निरोधक आदेश के समर्थन में उसकी घोषणा में याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी शारीरिक रूप से छोटे बच्चों पर हमला किया था कि कथित तौर पर।

जिरह पर याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी बच्चों कभी नहीं मारा गया है कि भर्ती कराया। बच्चों के किसी भी संभावित शारीरिक शोषण से संबंधित याचिकाकर्ता द्वारा कथित तौर पर केवल घटना बालों से एस हथियाने प्रतिवादी तक सीमित है। बच्चों के शारीरिक शोषण की किसी भी खतरे से संबंधित याचिकाकर्ता द्वारा कथित तौर पर ही घटना एक मैच के साथ एम धमकी प्रतिवादी तक सीमित है। याचिकाकर्ता वे together.7 रहते थे वह पिछले तीन वर्षों के दौरान प्रतिवादी के हाथों नुकसान उठाना पड़ा शारीरिक शोषण के बारे में व्यापक गवाही प्रदान की

वह समय की उस अवधि के दौरान बार-बार प्रतिवादी द्वारा बलात्कार किया गया है का दावा है। प्रतिवादी वह याचिकाकर्ता के साथ बलात्कार या उसके साथ बलात्कार करने की धमकी दी है कि इनकार किया। हालांकि, सुनवाई में रिकार्ड में पढ़ा उसके बयान गवाही में याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी केवल ऐसा करने के लिए धमकी दी थी कि कहा गया है। वह कभी उसने कहा उसके साथ बलात्कार किया जब पूछा कि क्या: "मुझे याद नहीं है। वह लगभग समय पर किया था। "Umaima अल-Harazi भी याचिकाकर्ता के दावे को प्रतिवादी के साथ असंगत था गवाह की गवाही उसके साथ बलात्कार किया था। याचिकाकर्ता एक बहुत ही करीबी दोस्त के रूप में वर्णित है जो सुश्री अल-Harazi, वह और याचिकाकर्ता अपने निजी जीवन के बारे में बातें विमर्श किया और लगभग हर रोज एक-दूसरे के साथ भेजी है कि गवाही दी थी।

2013 की गर्मियों की शुरुआत में, सुश्री अल-Harazi वह अपने पति द्वारा बलात्कार किया गया था और तुरंत इस बारे में याचिकाकर्ता में गुप्त था कि गवाही दी थी। इस तरह से उसे कुछ हुआ था, अगर वह याचिकाकर्ता जब उनसे पूछा गया, याचिकाकर्ता यह नहीं था। याचिकाकर्ता भारत छोड़ने के लिए पहले छह महीने की अवधि में हुई आरोप लगाया कि बलात्कार की संख्या के बारे में भी उसकी गवाही में असंगत था। 27 अगस्त 2014 की सुनवाई में, वह यह शायद दो या तीन बार था कि प्रत्यक्ष परीक्षा पर गवाही दी थी। 23 सितंबर 2014 को सुनवाई में, वह यह लगभग 10-12 गुना हो सकता था कि जिरह पर गवाही दी थी।

न्यायालय ने भी याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी अस्थायी DVPA निरोधक आदेश के समर्थन में घोषणा में उसके साथ बलात्कार किया था आरोप नहीं था कि नोटों। प्रतिवादी कहीं और घोषणा में इसके विपरीत दुरुपयोग के लिए और अधिक विशिष्ट आरोपों उसे "शारीरिक रूप से हमला 'किया था कि केवल एक सामान्य आरोप है। यह वह अपने घोषणा से यौन assualt की इतनी गंभीर आरोप लोप किया होगा पर विश्वास करना मुश्किल है, उसके बयान और उसके परीक्षण गवाही में वर्णित घटनाओं वास्तव में हुआ था उसके करीबी दोस्त को उसके बयानों में किसी भी बलात्कार था कि वहाँ से इनकार किया।

साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत देखते हुए कोर्ट ने याचिकाकर्ता वह प्रतिवादी द्वारा बलात्कार किया गया था कि उसे आरोपों के संबंध में विश्वसनीय है पता नहीं चलता है। उसकी गवाही की ऐसी सामग्री हिस्से के बारे में विश्वसनीयता की कमी को देखते हुए कोर्ट के रूप में अच्छी तरह से उसके अन्य गवाही में याचिकाकर्ता विश्वसनीय नहीं मिल रहा है। न्यायालय ने भी याचिकाकर्ता की विश्वसनीयता, भारत छोड़ने के लिए उसके कारणों के विषय में दिए गए बयान का आकलन करने में ध्यान में रखा गया है। 22 मई 2014 पर लिया उसके बयान में याचिकाकर्ता वह अपने पिता या प्रतिवादी के पिता अगले Syedna के रूप में सफल होता है यानी कि भारत और प्रतिवादी, क्योंकि उसके धार्मिक विश्वासों की थी छोड़ा मुख्य कारण का संकेत दिया।

"वह भी अपने पिता में विश्वास रखता है" अगर वह वापस प्रतिवादी के लिए जाना होगा कि क्या बारे में सुश्री अल-Harazi से एक सवाल के जवाब में याचिकाकर्ता ने कहा: "तुम क्यों Umaima पूछ रहे हो। । । बेशक मैं रहना होगा। । । । [ताहा] [याचिकाकर्ता के पिता में] विश्वास है कि मैं इस तरह के बच्चों के साथ दूर चले गए हैं कभी नहीं होगा कि, सुनिश्चित करने के लिए यह पता है "सुश्री अल-Harazi के लिए एक और संदेश में (प्रतिवादी के प्रदर्शन एफ), याचिकाकर्ता ने कहा:" मैं तुम्हें बता दिया है और मुझे लगता है कि यह केवल ईमान और मुझे लगता है मैं जिस तरह से छोड़ दिया है कि हक के लिए किया गया था कि फिर आपको बताना चाहता हूँ। "(प्रतिवादी के प्रदर्शन एच) अंत में, याचिकाकर्ता उसके बेटे का वीडियो पोस्ट किया है और उसके भतीजे बाहर बोल बेकर्सफील्ड में उसके आगमन पर लगभग तुरंत Syedna के उत्तराधिकारी के मुद्दे पर। इन बयानों सभी घरेलू हिंसा की थी, क्योंकि याचिकाकर्ता भारत भाग गए कि DVPA निरोधक आदेश के समर्थन में घोषणा में निहित बयान के विरोधाभासी हैं, "मेरे बच्चे और मैं केवल कुछ निजी सामान पकड़ा कि बात करने के लिए बढ़ता है, और के लिए भारत से भागकर हमारी सुरक्षा और नुकसान पहुंचाया जा रहा के डर में। "

न्यायालय की घटनाओं के याचिकाकर्ता के गायन विश्वसनीय होने के लिए नहीं मिल रहा है, क्योंकि कोर्ट DVPA निरोधक आदेश जारी करने के लिए पर्याप्त आधार नहीं है कि क्या यह निर्धारित करने के लिए प्रतिवादी की गवाही के लिए सीमित है। उसकी गवाही के दौरान प्रतिवादी याचिकाकर्ता द्वारा हुई (उन घटनाओं का विवरण याचिकाकर्ता द्वारा वर्णित उन लोगों से अलग है, हालांकि) के लिए कुछ घटनाओं गवाही दी है कि भर्ती कराया: वह बिस्तर से बाहर निकलना और स्कूल जाने के लिए तैयार होने के लिए मना कर दिया जब वह बाल द्वारा एस पकड़ा; वह शपथ ग्रहण के लिए एक मैच के साथ एम जीभ को जलाने की धमकी दी है; वह एक अवसर पर दीवार के खिलाफ याचिकाकर्ता के सेल फोन फेंक दिया; एक अन्य अवसर पर उन्होंने एक कार्यशाला में जाने से याचिकाकर्ता को रखने के लिए बेडरूम का दरवाजा बंद कर दिया; सेक्स करने में रुचि के याचिकाकर्ता की कमी से निराश हैं, तो वह बिस्तर की दीवार या पक्ष के खिलाफ उसके सिर और / या हाथ टक्कर लगी है।

पहली घटना के संबंध में, प्रतिवादी आम तौर पर वह सुबह में बिस्तर से बाहर बच्चों को प्राप्त करने के लिए जिम्मेदार है और स्कूल के लिए तैयार किया गया था कि गवाही दी थी। प्रतिवादी पहले उसे पाने के लिए उसके कमरे में चला गया जब 2013 में एक सुबह, एस नहीं मिला। वह स्टाल करने के लिए जारी रखा और बिस्तर से बाहर नहीं मिल गया था, प्रतिवादी उसके कमरे में चला गया और दो या तीन सेकंड के लिए उसके बाल पकड़ लिया। एस तो उठकर स्कूल के लिए तैयार हो गया। 12 अगस्त 1014 को, अदालत ने हिरासत और मुलाक़ात मुद्दों के संबंध में अपने विचार के बारे में परिवार संहिता की धारा 3042 के अनुसार एस से सुना। कोर्ट एस के साथ और एस प्रतिवादी के किसी डर व्यक्त किया था कि कोई समय में एक लंबी बातचीत की थी। वास्तव में, एस बार-बार वह प्रतिवादी के साथ रहने के लिए भारत वापस जाने के लिए अनुमति दी जानी है कि पूछा।

एम धमकी करने के लिए सम्मान के साथ, प्रतिवादी एम, समय पर सात साल पुराना है, अन्य बच्चों की उपस्थिति में खाने की मेज पर "एफ" शब्द का उपयोग किया गया था कि गवाही दी थी। प्रतिवादी वह उस शब्द का प्रयोग नहीं किया जाना चाहिए कि एम को बताया और उसे रोकने के लिए पूछा। एम के बारे में तीस मिनट के लिए शब्द दोहराने के लिए जारी रखा के बाद, प्रतिवादी उसके पास से चला रहा था, जो एम पकड़ा और उसने कहा कि वह उसके मुंह में एक माचिस रखा जाएगा कि शब्द कहने के लिए जारी रखा, तो वह एम को बताया। याचिकाकर्ता और प्रतिवादी दोनों प्रतिवादी बच्चों की जीभ में से किसी को (अन्यथा जलाया या) एक मैच कभी नहीं रखा गया है कि गवाही दी थी। इस घटना को रोकने के लिए कहा जा रहा है के बाद गालियां बकने की क्रिया का अपने बेटे के निरंतर उपयोग करने के लिए प्रतिवादी के गुस्से में प्रतिक्रिया प्रतीत होता है। कोर्ट साबुन या बच्चों बुरी भाषा के प्रयोग के माध्यम से उन्हें परीक्षण जब माता-पिता का उपयोग करने वाले अन्य खतरों के साथ एक बच्चे के मुंह धोने की धमकी के बराबर होने का बयान समझता है। यह वह भी ऐसा करने के लिए नहीं कहा जा रहा है के बाद गालियां बकने की क्रिया का उपयोग करने के लिए जारी के बाद से एम, पिता और पुत्र के बीच किसी पूर्व बातचीत पर आधारित है प्रतिवादी का डर नहीं था कि स्पष्ट है। इसके अलावा, कोर्ट ने नहीं किया था और नहीं हुआ है कि एक जलाया मैच के साथ अपने या अपने बच्चे की जीभ जलती हुई किसी भी माता पिता को सहन नहीं होगा।

इन घटनाओं में हुई जिसमें संदर्भ को देखते हुए कोर्ट ने बच्चों को शामिल करने के लिए इन दो घटनाओं "दुरुपयोग" का गठन और इसलिए एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश देने के लिए एक आधार प्रदान नहीं करते हैं कि पता नहीं चलता है। प्रतिवादी भी कहा कि वह याचिकाकर्ता के साथ बात करने के लिए गोपनीयता है चाहता था जब 2013 में वह युगल के बेडरूम का दरवाजा बंद कर दिया है कि स्वीकार किया। याचिकाकर्ता कमरे में जाने का प्रयास किया, जब प्रतिवादी दरवाजे के सामने खड़े हो कर ऐसा करने से उसे रोका। वे एक दूसरे को धक्का दे दिया, जब यह उन दोनों के बीच कुछ शारीरिक संपर्क में हुई। याचिकाकर्ता वह छोड़ना चाहता था कहा, प्रतिवादी उसे ऐसा करने की अनुमति दी। प्रतिवादी वह एक अवसर पर याचिकाकर्ता के सेल फोन फेंक दिया कि भर्ती कराया। वह काम से घर आया था और याचिकाकर्ता फोन पर बात भी उसे कंप्यूटर का उपयोग कर फर्श पर बैठे और किया गया था। प्रतिवादी उससे बात करना चाहता था और वह उसे अनदेखा कर रहा था। नतीजतन, वह उसके हाथ से निकल फोन ले लिया और दीवार के खिलाफ फेंक दिया।

अंत में, प्रतिवादी वह सेक्स में रुचि थी, लेकिन याचिकाकर्ता नहीं था जब शादी के पिछले कई वर्षों के दौरान कई बार कर रहे थे कि गवाही दी थी। इस अवसर पर उन्होंने उसके सिर या हताशा में दीवार के खिलाफ अपने हाथ नल होगा। एक समय प्रतिवादी उसकी मुट्ठी के साथ बिस्तर के किनारे मारा। इन घटनाओं को एक निरोधक आदेश जारी करने का समर्थन निर्धारण में, कोर्ट ने घरेलू हिंसा की पुनरावृत्ति को रोकने के लिए एक निरोधक आदेश के घोषित उद्देश्य माना जाता है। न्यायालय ने भी प्रतिवादी हुआ है और यह एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश के जारी वारंट चाहे गए मानते हैं कि काम की प्रकृति और गंभीरता से विचार किया है। वर्णित आचरण बलपूर्वक या आवर्ती हो जाएगा कि एक प्रकृति का होना प्रकट नहीं होता है।

न्यायालय ने भी याचिकाकर्ता क्योंकि हुआ था कि किसी भी घरेलू हिंसा का नहीं प्रतिवादी छोड़ दिया है, लेकिन पूरी तरह से उसकी वजह से दृढ़ता से Syedna के लिए उचित उत्तराधिकारी के बारे में धार्मिक विश्वास आयोजित विश्वास रखता है। प्रतिवादी वैवाहिक मुद्दों में से कुछ को हल करने के प्रयास में एक अपरिपक्व तरीके से प्रतिक्रिया व्यक्त की है, वहीं कोर्ट ने एक निरोधक आदेश वर्णित आचरण द्वारा warranted है पर विश्वास नहीं करता। इसलिए, कोर्ट ने एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए अनुरोध से इनकार करते हैं।
पहले 17 जनवरी 2014, पार्टियों और छोटे बच्चों के लिए परिवार संहिता की धारा 3424. के अनुसरण में इमरजेंसी अधिकारिता के प्रयोग भारत में रह रहा था। कोई हिरासत के आदेश 2014 की धारा 3421, वर्दी बाल हिरासत क्षेत्राधिकार और प्रवर्तन अधिनियम कैलिफोर्निया द्वारा अपनाया ("UCCJEA") का हिस्सा है, इस न्यायालय के मूल अधिकार क्षेत्र बनाने के लिए सीमा, 30 जनवरी को पक्षीय आदेश बनाने से पहले कोर्ट के लिए बनाया गया है कुछ शर्तों से मुलाकात कर रहे हैं, जब तक कि एक प्रारंभिक "बच्चे को हिरासत दृढ़ संकल्प" 8। पहले से विचार कैलिफोर्निया बच्चों की है कि क्या है "गृह राज्य।" धारा 3402 (G) को परिभाषित करता है "गृह राज्य," एक बच्चे के माता-पिता या माता पिता के रूप में काम कर रहा एक व्यक्ति के साथ रहते थे, जिसमें "राज्य होने के लिए, यहाँ प्रासंगिक है के रूप में तुरंत एक बच्चे को हिरासत कार्यवाही के प्रारंभ से पहले कम से कम लगातार छह महीनों के लिए। "धारा 3405 यह UCCJEA लागू करने के प्रयोजनों के लिए संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के एक राज्य के रूप में अगर एक विदेशी देश पर विचार करने के लिए इस कोर्ट की आवश्यकता है।

यह संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के एक राज्य थे और भारत ने निर्धारित करने के बाद determination.9 एक प्रारंभिक बच्चे को हिरासत बनाने के लिए अपने क्षेत्राधिकार का निर्धारण करने के प्रयोजनों के लिए छोटे बच्चों के 'गृह राज्य' है निर्धारित है, और अगर रूप में इसलिए, कोर्ट ने भारत में इलाज किया गया है धारा 3424 प्रदान करता है की नहीं कैलिफोर्निया, छोटे बच्चों के लिए गृह राज्य है, अधिकार क्षेत्र के लिए न्यायालय के संभावित उपखण्ड धारा 3424. के अनुसार अस्थायी आपात अधिकार क्षेत्र से व्यायाम तक सीमित है (एक): "इस राज्य की एक अदालत अगर अस्थायी आपात अधिकार क्षेत्र है बच्चे को इस राज्य में मौजूद है और बच्चे को छोड़ दिया गया है या यह बच्चा है, या बच्चे के एक भाई या माता पिता, के अधीन है, या, दुराचार या दुरुपयोग के साथ धमकी दी है, क्योंकि बच्चे को बचाने के लिए एक आपात स्थिति में आवश्यक है। "

कानून दृढ़ता से बच्चों पर विवादों में स्वयं सहायता उपचार के एक माता पिता के व्यायाम हतोत्साहित। माता-पिता के बीच संघर्ष अदालतों का सहारा द्वारा remedied किया जा रहे हैं। MOFFAT वी Moffat (1980) 27 Cal.3d 645, 652। में में आनेवाला (1996) 14 Cal.4th 504, 530 के विवाह पुनः में फर्नांडीज-Abin का विवाह रे (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1043, अदालत के संदर्भ में UCCJEA आपातकालीन अधिकार क्षेत्र के व्यायाम पर चर्चा की निचली अदालत द्वारा जारी किए गए एक DVPA आदेश। [डब्ल्यू] ई न्यायाधीश शैल प्रस्तुत तथ्यों के तहत रोका गया था कि के लिए राजी नहीं हैं: अपील की अदालत ने निचली अदालत खंड 3424 एक माता पिता युगल बच्चों का अपहरण कर लिया था और पति घरेलू हिंसा में लगे हुए थे, जहां (क) के तहत अधिकार क्षेत्र में पाया गया कि अप्रैल 2009 में आपातकाल के अधिकार क्षेत्र के मुद्दे समीक्षा से, कैलिफोर्निया अदालत के बाद बच्चों ने भी देखा गया है कि पत्नी के खिलाफ घरेलू हिंसा में लगे हुए हैं कि पति पाया और कहा कि पति किसी भी अदालत से एक आदेश के बिना पत्नी से बच्चों को ले लिया पाया और देखने से पत्नी को रोका तीन महीने से अधिक के लिए उन्हें। [फुटनोट छोड़े गए।]

इस मामले में, अगले Syedna के रूप में (उसके पिता के खिलाफ) प्रतिवादी के पिता के चयन से नाखुश याचिकाकर्ता, भारत में उनके घर से बच्चों को ले लिया है और एक अदालत के आदेश या किसी के लाभ के बिना संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के लिए उन्हें लाया कैलिफोर्निया में उनके आगमन के बाद जब तक प्रतिवादी को नोटिस भेजा। प्रतिवादी देश के बाहर यात्रा कर रहा था जब उसने ऐसा किया। प्रतिवादी कई महीनों के लिए बच्चों के साथ किसी भी संपर्क करने में असमर्थ था। एक बार संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका में याचिकाकर्ता उसके बेटे का एक वीडियो पोस्ट किया है और उसके भतीजे उनके विश्वास की घोषणा उसे और उसकी बहन द्वारा तैयार एक स्क्रिप्ट पढ़ने कि याचिकाकर्ता के पिता नहीं है और प्रतिवादी के पिता वास्तविक Syedna है, माता-पिता के धार्मिक के बीच में इन बच्चों को रखने संघर्ष।

न्यायालय ने हिरासत और मुलाक़ात के संबंध में आपात अधिकारिता का प्रयोग करने के लिए पर्याप्त इन तथ्यों को पाता है। तदनुसार, कोर्ट में वर्णित तथ्यों तत्काल प्रतिवादी के हिरासत में बच्चों की वापसी की जरूरत है कि पाता है। कोर्ट पुरस्कार प्रतिवादी के लिए एकमात्र शारीरिक हिरासत के साथ माता-पिता दोनों को संयुक्त कानूनी हिरासत,। याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी के लिए 48 घंटे की नोटिस पर भारत में छोटे बच्चों के साथ मुलाक़ात की नहीं होगी। मुलाक़ात नाबालिग बच्चों के निवास के शहर में घटित होगी और हर तीस दिन की लंबाई में एक सप्ताह तक का समय हो सकता है। याचिकाकर्ता उचित टेलीफोन या नाबालिग बच्चों के साथ अन्य इलेक्ट्रॉनिक संपर्क किया जाएगा और बच्चों को असीमित, unmonitored टेलीफोन या याचिकाकर्ता के साथ अन्य इलेक्ट्रॉनिक संपर्क किया जाएगा। धारा 3424 (ख) घटना में मूल क्षेत्राधिकार वाले राज्य की एक अदालत में शुरू नहीं किया गया है UCCJEA और एक बच्चे को हिरासत कार्यवाही के तहत लागू किए जाने की कोई पिछले बच्चे को हिरासत आदेश है कि वहाँ प्रदान करता है, इस न्यायालय के बच्चे को हिरासत दृढ़ संकल्प में रहेंगे एक आदेश तक प्रभावी प्रासंगिक कानूनों के तहत एक राज्य होने न्यायालय की एक अदालत से प्राप्त किया जाता है। कोई सबूत नहीं है एक ऐसी व्यवस्था है कि वहाँ प्रस्तुत किया गया था। नतीजतन, कोर्ट के आदेश, 3423 के लिए वर्गों 3421 के तहत एक राज्य होने न्यायालय की एक अदालत तक प्रभाव में समावेशी रहेगा, नाबालिग बच्चों के संबंध में आदेश को बनाता है। प्रतिवादी न्यायालय द्वारा हस्ताक्षर के लिए एक आदेश तैयार करेगा। माइनर के वकील के आदेश के प्रवेश पर राहत महसूस की जाएगी।
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जब तक अन्यथा निर्दिष्ट 1 आगे की सभी वैधानिक सन्दर्भ परिवार संहिता में कर रहे हैं।

2 अदालत ने कुछ शर्तों के अधीन प्रतिवादी के लिए बच्चों के साथ मुलाक़ात देने के आदेश की एक श्रृंखला बनाई और बाद में किया गया है।

3 इस मामले Ezzuddin वी। Ezzuddin, सर्द काउंटी सुपीरियर कोर्ट केस नंबर एस-1501-फ्लोरिडा-627,599 के साथ एक साथ सुना था।

4 प्रतिवादी इस न्यायालय DVPA अनुरोध के अपने विचार के लिए भारत के कानून को लागू करने का अनुरोध किया था। कोर्ट ने ऐसा करने के लिए मना कर दिया है। वी रैह के अनुसरण। परसेल (1967) Cal.2d 551 67, कानून के एक सच्चे विवाद नहीं है कि क्या यह निर्धारित करने के लिए लागू क़ानून या प्रभावित न्यायालय में से प्रत्येक के कानून के शासन के द्वारा सेवा सरकारी हितों या उद्देश्यों की जांच होगी अदालत। इस तरह के संघर्ष से मौजूद है, अदालत है कि क्षेत्राधिकार के कानूनों का मामला द्वारा प्रस्तुत विशेष संदर्भ में लागू नहीं किया गया क्षेत्राधिकार के हित में अधिक गंभीर रूप से प्रभावित हो जाएगा जो यह निर्धारित करने के लिए न्यायालय 'संबंधित हितों का विश्लेषण करना चाहिए। इस न्यायालय में एक और विश्लेषण की आवश्यकता होगी कि एक सच्चे संघर्ष नहीं है, तो यह निर्धारित करने के लिए प्रत्येक क्षेत्राधिकार के कानून का एक तुलनात्मक विश्लेषण कर सकता है इतना है कि भारत के कानूनों को लागू करने के लिए प्रतिवादी के अनुरोध को भारत के कानून के किसी भी बयान शामिल नहीं किया था।

5 52 Syedna याचिकाकर्ता के चाचा और प्रतिवादी के दादा था।

6 गवाही में एक बिंदु पर याचिकाकर्ता प्रतिवादी वह बुरी तरह से मुझे इलाज होता है कि में की दिशा में देखभाल के किसी भी भावनात्मक अभिव्यक्ति रोक होता है कि "होगा क्या चाहते थे नहीं कर रहा से पालन होता है कि नतीजों के उसके डर का वर्णन किया। वह मुझ पर नाराज हो जाएगा। उन्होंने कहा, "। एक बहुत ही नकारात्मक ढंग से मेरे साथ बातचीत रिपोर्टर की ट्रांसक्रिप्ट, 27 अगस्त 2014, पी होगा। 31 लाइनों 21-24। उसने यह भी प्रतिवादी "तुम मेरी आज्ञा का पालन नहीं करते हैं, मैं आप से बात नहीं करेंगे या मैं तुम्हारे साथ नहीं होगा।" उसे बताया था कि रिपोर्टर की ट्रांसक्रिप्ट, 27 अगस्त 2014, पी गवाही दी थी। 36, लाइनों 8-9।

7 न्यायालय याचिकाकर्ता द्वारा प्रस्तुत की घोषणा आम तौर पर प्रतिवादी उसे "शारीरिक रूप से हमला" का आरोप है कि नोटों। याचिकाकर्ता के किसी भी शारीरिक शोषण का कोई विश्वसनीय गवाही हुई थी।

8 "बाल हिरासत दृढ़ संकल्प" एक बच्चे के संबंध में कानूनी हिरासत शारीरिक, हिरासत, या मुलाक़ात के लिए उपलब्ध कराने के एक न्यायालय के एक निर्णय, डिक्री, या अन्य आदेश का मतलब है। अवधि एक स्थायी, अस्थायी, प्रारंभिक, और संशोधन के आदेश भी शामिल है। अवधि बच्चे को समर्थन या एक व्यक्ति के अन्य मौद्रिक दायित्व से संबंधित एक आदेश शामिल नहीं है। परिवार। C.§3402 (ग)।

9 भारत बच्चों के "गृह राज्य 'है और भारत अधिकारिता का प्रयोग करने के लिए मना कर दिया है वहाँ कोई सबूत नहीं है कि न्यायालय के दृढ़ संकल्प को देखते हुए धारा 3421 के तहत अधिकार क्षेत्र पर जोर देते हुए के लिए शेष संभावित ठिकानों अयोग्य हैं

____________________________________________________________________

कैलिफोर्निया न्यायालय के उस फैसले - प्रकरण 2

कोर्ट ने दस (10) दिनों के भीतर किसी भी पार्टी फ़ाइलें और controverted मुद्दों या बनावट यह बताता है कि एक दस्तावेज़ में कार्य करता है, जब तक अंतरिम निर्णय निर्णय का विवरण होगा सिविल प्रक्रिया अनुभाग 632. संहिता के प्रावधानों के अनुरूप अपनी अंतरिम निर्णय के इस बयान जारी करता है न्यायालय के कैलिफोर्निया नियम द्वारा प्रदान की जाने वाली अंतरिम निर्णय में शामिल नहीं प्रस्तावों, 3.1590 (ग) नियम। अगले आदेश लंबित है, इस अंतरिम निर्णय न्यायालय के अस्थायी आदेश का गठन किया।

पार्टियों चार नाबालिग बच्चों के माता पिता हैं: लालकृष्ण Ezzuddin (17 जुलाई 1998) का जन्म, एम Ezzuddin (15 फ़रवरी 2002) का जन्म, एन Ezzuddin (6 अक्टूबर 2004) का जन्म और एच Ezzudin (15 दिसंबर का जन्म , 2008)। 30 जनवरी 2014 को याचिकाकर्ता घरेलू हिंसा निवारण अधिनियम के अनुसार एक अस्थायी निरोधक आदेश के लिए उसके अनुरोध दायर ("DVPA"; परिवार Code1 खंड 6200 एट seq।) और नाबालिग बच्चों से संबंधित हिरासत और मुलाक़ात आदेश के लिए। 30 जनवरी 2014 को, अदालत ने एक पक्षीय आधार पर अस्थायी आदेश जारी किए और मूल रूप से याचिकाकर्ता या नाबालिग बच्चों से संपर्क करने से प्रतिवादी रोका कि व्यक्तिगत आचरण के आदेश और एक रहने दूर क्रम शामिल थे। एक आदेश भी याचिकाकर्ता नाबालिग बच्चों के एकमात्र कानूनी और एकमात्र शारीरिक हिरासत होता है और प्रतिवादी कोई visitation.2 होता है कि बनाया गया था

प्रतिवादी 7 मई 2014 को 2 मई, 2014 पर एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए अनुरोध करने के लिए अपनी प्रतिक्रिया दायर की है, प्रतिवादी न्यायालय की धारा 3424 के अनुसार अस्थायी आपात अधिकारिता का प्रयोग और आदेश है कि, अन्य बातों के साथ का अनुरोध एक आदेश के लिए उनके अनुरोध दायर हिरासत और मुलाक़ात के बारे में। कोर्ट ने अपने अस्थायी आपात अधिकारिता का प्रयोग करने के लिए 27 अगस्त, 23 सितंबर, 14 नवंबर, 18 और 25, और 3 दिसंबर, 2014 को, कोर्ट के एक DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए और प्रतिवादी के अनुरोध पर याचिकाकर्ता के अनुरोध की योग्यता के आधार पर एक सुनवाई आयोजित और नाबालिग बच्चों की वापसी हिरासत प्रस्तुत साक्ष्य के विचार के बाद him.3 करने और किए गए तर्कों, कोर्ट निम्नलिखित निर्णय करता है।

DVPA निरोधक आदेश के लिए अनुरोध। DVPA के प्रयोजनों के लिए घरेलू हिंसा की पुनरावृत्ति को रोकने के लिए और इसमें शामिल व्यक्तियों के विभाजन के लिए प्रदान करने के लिए कर रहे हैं। (§§6220, 6300) की जानकारी अदालत ने पिछले एक अधिनियम या दुरुपयोग के कृत्यों के उचित सबूत की संतुष्टि के लिए, शो प्रदान की अगर एक निरोधक आदेश जारी किया जा सकता है। (§6300।) उचित भाग में, DVPA एक पति के खिलाफ बढ़ावा "दुरुपयोग" के रूप में घरेलू हिंसा को परिभाषित करता है। (§6211 (क)।) अन्य बातों के अलावा, "दुरुपयोग" उस व्यक्ति को या किसी अन्य के लिए आसन्न गंभीर शारीरिक चोट की उचित आशंका में एक व्यक्ति को रखने या अनुसारी धारा 6320. (§6203 को enjoined जा सकता है कि व्यवहार में उलझाने का मतलब है। ) व्यवहार धारा 6320 में शामिल है, पर हमला करने की धमकी, परेशान, निजी संपत्ति को नष्ट करने, मेल से संपर्क करने या अन्यथा, या अन्य पार्टी की शांति को परेशान करने में शामिल हैं। (§6320 (क)।) एक घरेलू हिंसा निरोधक आदेश प्रत्येक मामले के विशेष परिस्थितियों पर विचार करने के बाद निचली अदालत के विवेक में टिकी हुई है अधिरोपित करने के लिए कि क्या निर्णय। नाडकर्णी की शादी (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495 में फिर से।

वर्तमान मामले में, पार्टियों 17 जनवरी 2014 को भारत छोड़ने और उसके भाई कहाँ रहता बेकर्सफील्ड, कैलिफोर्निया के लिए आ रहा से पहले याचिकाकर्ता को मुंबई, भारत में बसता था। पार्टियों को इस मामले की गतिशीलता को समझने के लिए India.4 में बसता है, जबकि याचिकाकर्ता एक निरोधक आदेश के लिए उसके अनुरोध का समर्थन करने पर निर्भर करता है कि घटनाओं सब हुआ, 17 जनवरी, 2014 के घटनाओं और उस तारीख को अग्रणी उन महत्वपूर्ण हैं। पार्टियों दाऊदी बोहरा विश्वास, मुस्लिम धर्म का एक संप्रदाय के सदस्य हैं। दाऊदी बोहरा के आध्यात्मिक नेता Syedna के रूप में जाना जाता है। 17 जनवरी 2014 को, 52 Syedna निधन हो गया। क्योंकि उनकी मृत्यु पर उनके sect.5 प्रमुख शाही परिवार के Syedna याचिकाकर्ता और प्रतिवादी माना जाता है भाग के साथ उनके परिवार के रिश्तों की, Syedna के लिए वास्तविक उत्तराधिकारी होना चाहिए जो पर एक विवाद नहीं था। याचिकाकर्ता यह उसके पिता होना चाहिए विश्वास रखता है। प्रतिवादी यह अपने चाचा होना चाहिए विश्वास रखता है। उसकी मौत के लिए दो साल पहले, 52 Syedna उत्तराधिकारी Syedna के रूप में प्रतिवादी के चाचा नियुक्त किया था। उत्तराधिकारी के रूप में प्रतिवादी के चाचा के पद पर नियुक्ति के बाद, वह और याचिकाकर्ता प्रत्येक सोचा वास्तविक उत्तराधिकारी होना चाहिए, जो के बारे में कोई चर्चा नहीं था। 52 Syedna की मृत्यु के समय, प्रतिवादी और उनके चचेरे भाई, ताहा सैफुद्दीन (उनकी पत्नी, इस मामले में याचिकाकर्ता की बहन द्वारा लाया एक साथी DVPA मामले में प्रतिवादी), श्रीलंका के लिए एक धार्मिक यात्रा पर थे। Syedna की मौत के सीखने पर, वे तुरंत घर लौट आए।

उन्हें अनजान, याचिकाकर्ता और उसकी बहन दोनों अपने-अपने बच्चों के साथ संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के लिए भारत छोड़ दिया था। 20 जनवरी 2014 को, कुछ ही देर में कैलिफोर्निया में उनके आने के बाद याचिकाकर्ता वास्तविक Syedna के रूप में उनके नाना उच्चारण, साथ में उसके सबसे पुराने बेटे, मुर्तजा, और उसके चचेरे भाई मोहम्मद सैफुद्दीन दिखा तुम ट्यूब पर पोस्ट किया गया था कि एक वीडियो डाल मदद की। 30 जनवरी 2014 को याचिकाकर्ता एक अस्थायी DVPA आदेश के लिए उसके अनुरोध दायर किया। पक्षीय आदेश के व्यक्तिगत आचरण के लिए उपलब्ध कराने और आदेश दूर रहने और नाबालिग बच्चों के साथ प्रतिवादी के लिए कोई मुलाक़ात दिए गए।

NoorAli-M
Posts: 95
Joined: Sun Jan 25, 2015 9:28 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#25

Unread post by NoorAli-M » Wed Jan 28, 2015 2:53 am

all my posts are in general (which normally happens) nothing to do with this particular case, her claims may be true or may be false. Allah knows best.

araz5253
Posts: 236
Joined: Fri Jan 23, 2015 1:18 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#26

Unread post by araz5253 » Wed Jan 28, 2015 3:05 am

Moiz_Dhaanu wrote:
topiwala wrote:Why you people love to slander our Maula? Why dont you rather criticize the Sunni caliphs? This site should be held responsible for driving gullible bohras to sunni\wahhabi etc. You people operate just like wahhabis!
what a joke !!
So when Bohras listen and abide to your Moula(DMBS) who gives absolute nonsense fatwaas (like roti making will lead to jannat and women to be thrown out of house for not wearing ridah), they are not gullible but are doing it out of ikhlaas,
And when those same "ikhlaasi" bohras come on this website and read factual matter(which makes them aware of the truth) and try questioning your moula's actions then you term them "Gullible"..
Waah!! what 2-prongued idealogy you followers of DMBS have :twisted:

DMBS = Dawedaar Mufaddal Bhai Saheb
topiwala ,why you have partisan mentality?? Do you think the ahlebayt were like bohraS?? they would be more ashamed of these bohras and would themselves boycott and condemn the bohra mentality if they at all would be present today.

Look how muffy has exploited the pious names of ahlebayt to run his business, why people make parties just based on these names alone?? , why they not think that this very names are misued by satan like how he did with Jesus and Christians.

alivasan
Posts: 372
Joined: Thu May 15, 2014 9:28 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#27

Unread post by alivasan » Wed Jan 28, 2015 7:00 am

ghulam muhammed wrote:The charges traded against each other are enough proof to conclude that they are mortals like everyone else and don't need to be treated as divine beings born out of some divine personality !! This is just a tip of an iceberg and more skeletons could come out of the closet of the so called Royal family which is given undue importance and pampered by the gullible bohras.

Agree..the rape charges are no less than ones known in bandait queen.so called divine zadaas (haramzadas)taha s private sex life is in public.much more to come how so called divine jungles beard dhongi babas exposed..what will goon like sabbir rajabli say in defend to his masters inhuman act..deserves severe punishment from public at large

Ozdundee
Posts: 866
Joined: Wed May 29, 2013 6:57 am

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#28

Unread post by Ozdundee » Wed Jan 28, 2015 8:09 am

NoorAli-M wrote:all my posts are in general (which normally happens) nothing to do with this particular case, her claims may be true or may be false. Allah knows best.
if they are a lie that can be regarded a serious issue , I think the lawyers would have advised them not to lie. I believe the judgment is quite fair.

ghulam muhammed
Posts: 11653
Joined: Tue Oct 07, 2008 5:34 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#29

Unread post by ghulam muhammed » Wed Jan 28, 2015 3:30 pm

Ozdundee wrote:
NoorAli-M wrote:all my posts are in general (which normally happens) nothing to do with this particular case, her claims may be true or may be false. Allah knows best.
if they are a lie that can be regarded a serious issue , I think the lawyers would have advised them not to lie. I believe the judgment is quite fair.
The issue here is not the judgement per se as its a temporary order which could be reversed by the higher courts. The issue here is with regard to the average Bohras who have all along been fed with the lies of so called divinity being present in the Dai's family and that how the Dai and his siblings are way above normal people as regards integrity, truth and honesty, they were perceived to be holier then thou. All these fanciful claims thrust upon generation of bohras are demolished by the manner in which serious charges are levelled against each other.

New
Posts: 440
Joined: Fri Jan 24, 2014 9:49 pm

Re: Saifuddin v/s Saifuddin: Child custody case judgment

#30

Unread post by New » Wed Jan 28, 2015 5:50 pm

Asad bhai, thanks for the translation. I believe the readership here is limited. How can one publicize to masses? The news paper can do it. The excrepts can be be published. Whatsup can help.
How about translation in Gujarati?